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Introduction
The EU19 policy and its relation to the process of disintegration of the
Yugoslav federation has been featured quite a lot. However, within these
general EU policy toward the Yugoslavian problem there was an, more or
less, individual policy toward each constitutive republics of Yugoslavia. That is
exactly the matter that will be dealt in this paper. In this way we will try to
present the specific EU policy towards Macedonia as one of the six
constitutive republics of the former Yugoslav federation for the period of the
duration of the Yugoslav crisis. The logical question here is what exactly we
mean by the term "Yugoslav crisis" and precisely what time framework we are
talking about. At this point we are not going to specify the exact dates but we
are going simply to suggest that "Yugoslav crisis" is a few months period
before the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, including the
military actions in these two republics, until the Dayton Peace Agreement for
B&H. After this there was a period of stagnation and relatively peaceful
conditions in the territory of former Yugoslavia, but only until 1999, when a
military conflict broke out in the so-called "southern front” in Kosovo and later
in 2001 in Macedonia. However, the conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia can
not be included in the term ,,Yugoslav crisis”, because of the fact that at that
time Yugoslavia did not exist anymore and that these military conflicts
occurred in two different sovereign and mutually recognized states20. So, in
this paper we will try to highlight the most important elements of EU policy
towards Macedonia during the Yugoslav crisis and the question which
influences this policy had on the newly independent Republic.
19 In that time still  European Communities - EC20 Kosovo conflict occurred in the Serbian province of Kosovo as part of FRY. Macedonian
2001 conflict  occurred in the northern parts of Republic of Macedonia.
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EU policy towards Macedonia in the period from the beginning of the
Yugoslav crisis to the Hague conference
In order to present the politics and relations of the EU towards
Macedonia, firstly we must see the behavior of Macedonia during the
Yugoslav crisis. Going backwards we can see that the Republic of Macedonia
was not one of the leader republics of the dissolution process of Yugoslavia.
Rather, we can conclude that largely goes exactly the opposite. Some
Macedonian politicians even made efforts together with politicians from the
other republics to find a mutually acceptable solution and to rescue the
common state. Such example was the Izetbegovic – Gligorov platform21 which
was not accepted by the other republics. So, in a situation where Macedonia
could not be qualified as “secessionist" republic, it could not be subject of
significant diplomatic activities by the EU. This was the case because of the
fact that just before the declaration of independence by both northern
Yugoslav republics, the Union had built a common position which consisted of
condemnation and disapproval of any kind of unilateral declaration of
independence of any republic22, but also of condemnation and disapproval of
eventual use of force to retain the wholeness of Yugoslavia23. Simply, the
general EU position was to support the survival of Yugoslavia. So, all the
republics which had the same position were not subject of diplomatic action
by the EU. Logically, subject of diplomatic action by the EU were the republics
that opted for dissolution of Yugoslavia, opposite of the EU position. In
accordance with the general tendency of Macedonia to help the federation
survive, the main activity of the EU in this initial period, was not directed
towards Macedonia, but primarily towards the pro-dissolution Slovenia and
Croatia on one hand and towards the federal and pro-centralistic positioned
Belgrade and the Yugoslavian national army (YNA) which threatened to use
force to preserve the federation on the other hand. However, the joint EU
position did not change the mind of decided Slovenia. Nevertheless, the
Slovenia decided unilaterally to declare independence. This event gradually
transformed the previous political crisis in Yugoslavia into an open military
21 06.03.199122This position was primarily a message to Slovenia and Croatia23This position was primarily a  message to Belgrade and YNA
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conflict. The conflict erupted between the Slovenian territorial forces from one
side and the YNA from the other side. This conflict was a strong signal for the
EU to do something against the war that threatened to extend to the wider
Yugoslav territory. This situation forced EU to make more concrete step. The
Union’s answer consisted of sending the so-called “troika of ministers”24 with
a precise mission in Yugoslavia. The specific objective of the mission was to
bring out an immediate cessation of fire and to prevent its further expansion.
This EU diplomatic activity resulted with the ,,Brijuni Agreement”25. This
document provided a three month delay of the independence declarations of
Slovenia and Croatia on one hand and a cease of all military activities by the
YNA in Slovenia on the other hand. Specifically for Slovenia, the EU
diplomatic activity meant two things, firstly, getting independence, and
secondly, withdrawal of the YNA forces from Slovenian territory without further
struggle. However, this did not mean cease of the fire that now moved on
Croatian territory, which demanded further inclusion of the EU.
Where was the Republic of Macedonia at this time? Before the
Conference for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, the Republic of
Macedonia already had applied to the Union as an individual (though still part
of the Federation) with a memorandum entitled "The international position of
Macedonia and its status in the Yugoslav community." In this memorandum
the Republic expressed its views and stood for survival of Yugoslavia as a
union of sovereign states with some federal elements. The memorandum
mentioned also the “European processes”. Malevski(2006,p.26) said ,,The
Disintegration of the economic and the political system of Yugoslavia in form
that has been existing until today, faced with the need of fundamental
reconstruction of the state. This process of reorganization of relations
between the Yugoslav republics should correspond with the European
processes. This means mutual respect for the independence and sovereign
position of each state as a precondition for higher forms of integration.“ If we
analyze the positions of the Republic of Macedonia expressed in the
Memorandum, we will notice that they are practically the same solutions that
24 The troika comprised  the past, present and coming  foreign Ministers of the Presidency of
the European Council of ministers25a document signed on the Brijuni islands near Pula, Croatia, on 7 July 1991 by
representatives of the Republic of Slovenia, Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia under the political sponsorship of the European Community.
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later the EU offers at the Hague Conference about the Former Yugoslavia. So
the Macedonian positions were in the line with those of the EU. The
Memorandum itself is very significant for Republic of Macedonia, because the
Republic referred directly to the EU as individual, not as a part of the
federation; consequently it imposed itself as participant and as a stricken
party that can not be ignored in future decisions and projections about
Yugoslavia.
Hague Conference on Former Yugoslavia
The success or failure of the EU diplomatic which resulted in signing
the Brijuni Declaration can be debated. It might have been successful for
Slovenia, but has not fulfilled the main objective of the EU mission in
Yugoslavia, which was preventing the further spread of fire. However, here we
are more specifically interested in the EU chosen approach of dealing with the
beginning of the wars in Yugoslavia. The original method chosen by EU was
an ad hoc approach to the solving of the conflicts. So, at the moment there
was a specific (military) problem in Slovenia and according to the selected ad
hoc approach, the specific issue discussed was the situation in Slovenia.
After the outbreak of military conflict in Croatia EU understood that the
problem has not been solved at all and appointed a mediator to work on
solving the Yugoslav problem which was already defined as European
problem. This is due to at least two facts. First, USA gave the “main player”
role to the EU and second EU26 was not the same any more after Maastricht.
One of the main changes made with this treaty was the introduction of the
Unions pillar system. According to this, one of the three pillars was European
Common Foreign and Security policy - CFSP27. Unlike the first pillar28, in the
second (CSFP) pillar and in the third pillar29 the principle of supranationalism
is replaced with the principle of intergovernmentalism. The reason for this is
26 The Treaty of Maastricht signed on 7 February 1992 transformed the EC into the European
Union27The historical origin of CFSP was the European Political Cooperation (EPC) introduced by
the Single European Act from198628 European Communities29Justice and Home Affairs
European Scientific Journal
25
the fact that the issues treated outside the first pillar, were much more
sensitive for the member states in a terms of their sovereignty.  Because of
this, the decision methods in the second and the third pillars, in the most of
the cases, requires unanimity among the member states. CFSP was
necessary, among others, to improve the perception of EU as an economic
giant but a political pygmy. So, if EU wants to be a global player, the logical
way of thinking is that EU must be player and main manager in its own yard.
For first special mediator was appointed Lord Carrington and later Lord Owen.
The diplomatic activity of the EU lasted much more opposed to some previous
and euphoria statements regarding to the success of the EU in bringing peace
in Yugoslavia after the Brijuni agreement. So, during its dealing with the
Yugoslav problem EU organized series of conferences in The Hague30 and
together with the UN was organizer of the London Conference31 and the
Geneva Conference32.
Unlike the original ad hoc EU approach for solving specific conflicts,
the Union decided now, on the Hague peace Conference under the leadership
of Lord Carrington to use a different approach to the Yugoslav issues. ,,Peace
Conference was, theoretically, exactly what Yugoslavia needed because it
aimed to consider the country as a whole and to develop a coordinated
approach to all conflicts in the region rather than merely deal with immediate
flash-points, such as that in Croatia, in isolation.. while conditions in B&H and
Macedonia should be equally part of the agenda as those in Slovenia and
Croatia."(Bennett 1995, p.176).The goal of this peace conference was to find
an solution for the ongoing war in Croatia and a comprehensive solution for
other conflicts in Yugoslavia. All the Yugoslav republics were represented.
Even the Kosovo Albanians and Vojvodina Hungarians had their
representatives. So thanks to this new EU approach, Macedonia officially
became part of the common EU policy agenda and the situation in Macedonia
rose to the level of equal importance with the situation in Croatia, which was a
war field at that time. Why was this so important for the Republic of
Macedonia? The answer is, because through The Hague Conference, for the
first time in history, the Republic of Macedonia took part at an international
30 09.199131 08.199232 09.1993
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conference presented by its own representatives and became an equal
participant. This international conference discussed, among other things,
about the future of Macedonia. This is certainly the beginning of an
independent Macedonian foreign policy. The Macedonian representatives at
this conference were Kiro Gligorov, as Minister of Foreign Relations, Denko
Malevski and Vasil Tupurkovski as members of the Presidency of Yugoslavia
(Gligorov 2001). They were sitting side by side with their colleagues from
Serbia- Milosevic, Croatia –Tugman, B&H - Izetbegovic, Slovenia – Kucan,
Montenegro- Bulatovic. The Macedonian representative Kiro Gligorov had a
speech at the Conference and presented his views (Gligorov 2011).
According to his views, first, Macedonia believed that despite all the difficulties
the existence of Yugoslavia was still possible in a new form but on the
principle of affirmation of the sovereignty of the republics; second, the
concerns of the international community and especially the EC were
legitimately and justified; third,  there was need for cessation of all military
actions as precondition for negotiations; fourth, the republics needed mutual
recognitions as a basis for equality in the future status of the Yugoslav
community and fifth, Macedonia was committed to good neighborhood
relations and had willingness as well as to play a role of an active factor of
peace and stability in the Balkans. Undisputable is the fact that the Hague
Conference was very important for Macedonia. However, if we make a real
critical review of The Hague Conference, we can find out that although
originally it had a working agenda that treats Yugoslavia as a whole and all
the problems in all the republics as equal, in reality it appeared to be
mediating in finding a solution between the big republics, like Serbia and
Croatia. This can be also confirmed with the following interview part given by
Lord Carrington (The death of Yugoslavia 1995) “We decided to see people
who actually mean something, the Presidents Milosevic and Tugman and we
set them on the table and began to talk to them." We can conclude that this
picture has been repeated more or less on all future conferences organized
by EU and with the time the primacy of the agenda was mainly concentrated
on B&H, as well as on the main actors, Croatia and Serbia, while all the other
republics were only formally part of the agenda. Just for illustration we will
take the example of the London Conference in which Macedonia was
European Scientific Journal
27
presented by President Gligorov, ministers Maleski, Frckovski and Vice
President of the Parliament Dzheljadin Murati. Although there were
Macedonian representatives on this Conference, the Macedonian question
was not treated hire.”Before we began with the regular work with
determination of the agenda, I asked the Conference to consider the issue of
the Macedonian recognition. But unfortunately the issue did not come into
agenda.” Gligorov (2001) However, as solution which would avoid further
military, the Hague Peace Conference suggested creating a form of states
association, a kind of confederation. It proposed respect for the minority rights
and recognition of the former internal administrative boundaries as
international borders. In this way further military actions could be avoided and
the region (probably faster than Eastern Europe) could very soon advance
towards EU membership. This solution was in accordance with the
Macedonian interests, because it was meant to avoid further military conflicts
that could be easily transferred in the Macedonian territory. It would also help
Macedonia to achieve two huge historical and strategic goals, first, to become
practically independent and to be recognized by Serbia and second to speed
up its course towards EU membership. Therefore, Macedonia33 has generally
positive disposition towards the EU plan. However this plan was not
successful34 and the war in Yugoslavia has been just stirring up, so the
Macedonian path to independence became additionally complicated.
33 The same as Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia34 Mostly because of the Milosevic disagreement
European Scientific Journal
28
Badinter Arbitration Committee and the implications of its
opinions on Macedonia
Hague Conference is important for Macedonia also for another thing.
Namely, the decision to organize this kind of peace conference was made at
the EC Counsel Meeting held on 27th August 1991. At this meeting it has been
made also a decision to establish the Arbitration Committee. Actually, the
Committee has been established to help by providing legal opinions to the
work of The Hague Peace Conference. Thus, these opinions would have
strong influence on the policy of the Union toward Yugoslavia, i.e. Macedonia
respectively. The head of the Commission was Robert Badinter, a famous
lawyer and Chairman of the Constitutional Court of France. The Commission
was composed by legal experts. Its members were the presidents of
constitutional courts in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain35. Regarding the
opinions of the Commission, there were some discussions in terms of their
weight. Although foreign ministers of the EC initially agreed that they should
be legally binding, normally for the parties that would accept its jurisdiction,
later they were only treated as advisory. The reasons for this reduction of the
importance of the Commission decisions is given by the authors Lukic& Lynch
(1996): “in order not to allow legal opinions in advance to prevent any political
agreements…This implicated that virtually anything can be negotiated." So,
the point was not to allow the legal aspects and the law to be an obstacle to
any possible political agreements. In this particular case we can say that the
law was subordinate to the politics. However, the Badinter Commission was
composed of leading experts in law who came from different EU countries in
order to be neutral and to build their views based on purely legal and not
political grounds.
The commission was called to give its opinion about the legal
consequences of the dissolution of Yugoslavia on 15 specific questions. We
will make a brief analysis of some of these issues that we think were relevant
for the creation of EU policy towards Macedonia. The first question on which
Badinter Commission gave its opinion was asked personally by the Lord
35Irene  Petry,  Roman Herzog, Aldo Corasaniti and Francisco Tomás y  Valiente
respectively.
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Carrington and was a question with paramount importance. In fact it has been
searched for a legal interpretation of the process of disintegration of
Yugoslavia. Thus, Serbia and Montenegro believed that all those republics
that have decided to become independent (including Macedonia) should be
considered as secessionist ones and that SFRY should continue to exist with
the republics that would decide to stay (at least Serbia and Montenegro). On
the other hand, all the other republics (including Macedonia) and above all
Slovenia and Croatia, thought that this is not a secession process but a
disintegration process in accordance with the will of the founding republics
and therefore all these six republics are equal successors to the former
federation in a way that none of them alone can claim to be sole heir of the
former federation. The opinions of the Commission took the position of
second view and concluded that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution.
On 4th July 1992 the Commission concluded that the process of dissolution of
Yugoslavia had been finished and that the SFRY no longer existed. Also
according to the legal interpretation of the Badinter Commission all former
republics are legal successors of the former Yugoslavia. In this way Serbian
views on Serbia and Montenegro as sole successors of Yugoslavia fell into
water. It was a legal question concerning the Republic of Macedonia. The
outcome of opinion was favorable for Macedonia. According to the opinion all
the republics that declare independence, can not be considered as secession
states created by cutting a territory from a previous state, but as successor
states of former Yugoslavia with all rights and obligations arising from it. So
thanks to this interpretation, the Republic of Macedonia participated later in
the division of joint property of Yugoslavia, of the diplomatic and consular
offices around the world and so on.
Besides the first one, particularly interesting is also the second opinion,
although it does not have direct importance for Macedonia. It was a question
asked by the Republic of Serbia regarding the rights of the Serb population in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as constituent nations of Yugoslavia,
specifically in relation to the right of self-determination. The opinion of the
Commission practically consisted of two important elements. The first one
was that the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are entitled to
have political and cultural autonomy within Croatia and B&H, and the second
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one was that they do not have right to establish a new state or joint other
countries on its own will. This question and this opinion did not have any
direct relevance for Macedonia but certainly they had great importance in the
international law, especially for countries that have a high minority population
(including Macedonia).
The third opinion was given as a response to a question asked again
by the Republic of Serbia. The question demanded clarification and
interpretation of the dispute between the republics about the former internal -
administrative boundaries between the republics, specifically between Croatia
and Serbia, B&H and Serbia, whether they are borders in terms of
international law. The opinion of the Commission was to confirm or deny the
Serbian-Montenegrin claim that these former national boundaries had a purely
administrative character and accordingly they can not automatically become
international and interstate borders. Although this question does not directly
mention Republic of Macedonia, it was still of great interest for it. The legal
basis that can be used as an argument for the former administrative republic
borders between Serbia and Macedonia depended directly on the legal
interpretation of the former internal republican borders by the Commission.
According to the possible results of its legal interpretation, the former internal
borders could become international or be contested by Serbia as purely
administrative and they can be redefined. The response of the Commission
may be interpreted as positive for Croatia, B&H and Macedonia. Especially
important for Macedonia was the interpretation of the Commission that  ,,the
borders between Croatia and Serbia, B&H and Serbia and between other
possible adjacent independent states may not be altered except by
agreement between them " and that ,,according established principles of
international law amending the external borders by force can not produce any
legal effects,,. (Lukic& Lynch 1996)  This was positive for Macedonia because
it emphasized the principle that no one is allowed to use force to alter
boundaries and even though this happens it can not be legally recognized.
Particularly interesting for comparison is the opinion no. 5 given by the
Commission regarding the request for recognition of the independence of
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Croatia by the EU. Thus, the Commission36 reserved the current recognition
of Croatia’s independence, believing that Croatia must first improve the
minority rights through legal amendment of their own legislation.
The most important opinion of the Badinter Commission which directly
concerns Macedonia was the opinion no. 6, in which the application for
recognition of Macedonia has been reviewed to find out whether the country
fulfils the conditions set by the EU in order to become a recognized
independent republic. Interesting to note is that besides examining the
necessary conditions for recognition, which are valid for the other republics
that applied for recognition, in the case of Macedonia another supplementary
question has been considered. The Commission also worked on the Greek
government statement according to which the use of the name "Macedonia"
as a name for the country, would mean irredentism toward Greece. According
to the opinion of the Commission, there was no obstacle to the recognition of
Macedonia's independence, i.e. Macedonia fulfilled all necessary conditions
for this. Actually, the Commission implicitly rejected the Greek government
claims that using the word "Macedonia" implied irredentism to Greece. This
opinion was very favorable for Macedonia.
Contradictions
The commission was created with the task to provide legal opinions on
the Hague Peace Conference organized by the EU. So, any Commission
opinion had a great legal weight and logically it should be taken into
consideration during the building of common foreign policy of the EU.
However, if we make a comparison between the content of the legal opinions
No.5 and No.6 and their real effect through the conduct of the Union, we can
conclude that the EU acted quite contrary to what was the opinion of the
committee that EU created. Why do we need this comparison? Because
through this comparison we can see the approach of the EU towards the
Yugoslav issue and accordingly we can infer the EU policy towards
Macedonia. The previous conclusion reveals one thing. The approach of the
EU was primarily a political and the international law was on second place.
36 On 11.01.1992
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Thus, because of the individual interests of member countries (mainly
Germany) Croatia was given the recognition (for which the Commission37 had
expressed reserves in terms of meeting the requirements for its recognition)
and at the same time the recognition of the independence of Macedonia was
postponed (although the Commission38 confirmed adamantly that Macedonia
fulfilled all conditions set by the EU for its recognition) because of the
opposition by the Greek government (whose arguments the Commission had
already declared as not relevant). The reason for this political decision by the
EU consisted of various interests of its different member states. While the
republics of Slovenia and Croatia had their own strong supporter in the EU
member states expressed primarily in the face of powerful Germany, the
Republic of Macedonia not only that did not have a strong supporter within the
Union, but it had quite the opposite of that in the face of its first neighbor
Greece, both EU and NATO member. “the German government decided to
recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia on 19.12.1991. ...
because of consideration of the sensibility of its partners, the recognition was
not implemented until 15th Jan.1992., date when 12 member states of the EC
agreed with it. "(Lukic & Lynch 1996). The previous quotation reveals
Germany's position as a strong supporter of Slovenia and Croatia, which not
only lobbies but also puts pressure on the other members to recognize their
independence. Lobbying by a powerful state as Germany certainly gave
results. This placement of activities resulted in a decision by the EU member
states to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. In contrast, the
Republic of Macedonia remains unrecognized for a longer period, despite the
positive opinion given by the Commission, i.e. by the Europe top legal
experts, and because of placing individual political interests on first place and
treating the law as secondary importance. The harsh reality Macedonia was
able to feel already on the EU summit held on 15.01.1992, where the member
states of the Union decided to recognize the independence of Slovenia and
Croatia, but not the independence of Macedonia.
In terms of EU policy towards Macedonia we can notice one more
thing. EU did not treat the name issue as a real issue and as a potential
significant problem. At the same time, the denial of the name by the
37 Opinion no.538 Opinion no.6
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neighboring Republic of Greece turned into one of the top priorities in its
foreign policy and Greece used all the possible mechanisms in all
organizations whose member it is (including EU) to resolve this issue
according to its own national interest. Thus, immediately after the positive
opinion about the recognition of the independence of Macedonia given by the
Badinter Commission, on the next EU summit39 the name issue was for the
first time officially raised by Greece “,immediately after the meeting where the
EU recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Michelis on 15th
January hold a press conference in Rome and said that (the recognition of
Macedonia) it was only delayed for a short time to clear up some Greek
reservations and it would not need more than a few weeks to find a solution.
The name issue was not a real problem according to his opinion, nor did the
EU make it a precondition for the recognition.” (Mirchev 2006, p.98). This way
of minimizing the significance of the name issue was an integral part of the
original policy of the Union towards Macedonia. At the EU summit held in
Lisbon on June 27th, 1992 there was a full victory of the Greek diplomacy and
of the lobbying performed inside the Union. At the same summit, the EC
concluded that they would recognize the Republic of Macedonia as an
independent state only if it rejects the word “Macedonia” from its name. In this
way the problem, which according to the original terminology used by EU
officials was not a problem nor a precondition for recognition of the republic,
now officially became both. This Greek position toward Macedonia's name
became practically a common position of all EU members countries.
With the action of the EU towards Yugoslavia, i.e. Macedonia, it can be
noticed a certain contradiction of the desired objectives of the Union and the
acts it made in reality. Thus, Macedonia step out of Yugoslavia in a fully
legitimate and peaceful way through the use of exclusively democratic means,
not by going into any military conflict with the YNA. It signed an agreement
with YNA for YNA’s peaceful departure from the country. With all this facts we
can conclude that Macedonia was the only republic of former Yugoslavia
which left the federation in a peaceful and democratic way. So, Macedonia
was the factor of safety and peace. “Macedonia was the only country which
was not directly involved in crises and wars in the 1990s. For a long time,
39 15.01.1992
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Macedonia has been recognized as a kind of oasis of peace." (Mahncke,
Ambos & Reynolds 2004)
Because of all these facts the attitude of the EU can be characterized
as surprising. Namely, one of the Union’s main objectives concerning the
Yugoslav issue, determinated already with the Brijuni Agreement, was to
prevent further spread of the fire. According to that, the Union decided to
recognize Slovenia, Croatia and B&H, despite the other reasons, in order to
prevent the aggressive ambitions of Serbia on the territory of Croatia and
B&H. So, in accordance with the objectives of EU policy and in accordance
with the positive opinion of the Commission established by the EU, the Union
was expected to support this peaceful approach to Macedonia, especially
because of the fact that Macedonia was in a similar situation like B&H and
because almost every one of its neighbors sit right on Macedonia. By delaying
the recognition of Macedonia, instead of helping to strengthen the safety and
security in this part of the Balkans, EU influenced directly the process of
returning of almost one century old appetites of Macedonia's neighbors that
already had separated Macedonian territory in 1913. By delaying the
recognition EU practically created an unrecognized territory, a part of the
former federation that did not have even army. This could easily be
interpreted by the neighbors of Macedonia as a message of the great powers
that the territory of Macedonia can be recomposed. “In February 1992, the
Greek prime minister calls for meeting the leaders of Greece, Bulgaria,
Romania and Serbia (at that time still belonged to the Yugoslavia). Bulgaria
did not agree to attend at this ‘mini-Balkans Summit’, another international
forces intervened too, so the meeting canceled.” (Mirchev 2006, p.85). The
guest list was not at random. These states are the states that had signed the
Bucharest Peace Agreement40 according to which Macedonian territory had
been divided between them. Now with the collapse of Yugoslavia, Macedonia
was ones again seen as unrecognized territory that can be subject of a new
division. The question here is, why EU (with its policy) allowed anybody to
interpret in this way its policy and why EU allowed somebody to heat the
passions for a possible new military conflict, this time on the territory of
Macedonia, which could easily include countries outside the former Yugoslav
40 1913
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federation. This projection of the future was not in interest of the Union, if not
for other reasons then because of its apparent inability to deal with already
existing war conflicts on European soil and consequently a new war conflict
would be hard to handle. An explanation of the possible reasons besides
these gives Mirchev (2006, p.84): “The practice showed that the international
community despite the obvious positive Macedonian behavior does not
possess mechanisms that would work positively for Macedonia.” He (Mirchev
2006, p.87) continues: “In this sense, the example of Macedonia is a small
part of the mosaic of controversies of the new reality in the world and the
European order." We agree with this position which suggests that it is more
likely that there was a lack of appropriate mechanisms in the post cold war
Europe, through which EU would have achieved its own goals, rather than the
Union deliberately would practice such a dubious policy. So, because of the
Greek reserves, shown in relation with the right of one of the successor
republics from the former Yugoslavia to continue to use its name, now as an
independent state, the process of recognition of Macedonia was postponed
and additionally complicated. Thus the security of this part from the Balkans
was threatened. So, the interests of individual EU member states (Greece)
were the reason for the controversial behavior of the Union toward
Macedonia. It was so, because EU had no additional mechanisms except
those that were already established, and Greece as a member maximally
abused them for its own national interests and advantages before the general
interests of the Union. Promoting individual state interests on first place and
putting the position of the Union on secondary place, has been already seen
in the EU. “National interest meant a lot more than a coherent European
action, as in the case of the rapid German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia
1991 despite the disagreements with partners from the EC." (Mahncke,
Ambos & Reynolds 2004). One of the reasons was the CFSP unanimously
decision making process. According to this system practically, each member
state has the right to veto any important decision in this policy.  But, this was
not the only reason. One example is the Greek economic embargo41, when
Greece unilaterally closed the border with Macedonia and in this way cut off
the closest sea connection to Macedonia. The Greek border was in the same
41 On 02.1994
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time the EU border, so the Greek trade embargo to Macedonia meant also the
EU trade embargo to Macedonia. It was expected the EU institutions to react
to this step of Greece, and they did it. The Commission asked the European
Court of Justice to bring the case of the possible violation of the Maastricht
treaty, article 225 – taking unilateral measures against the Community law.
But, just before the Court gave its verdict, the Commission suddenly withdrew
the lawsuit. This example clearly shows that the problem was not only in the
CFSP limitations mostly because of the unanimity decision process. Namely,
the example above was legally part of the first pillar filed in which the
supranational decision making prevail. So what can we suggest is that the
principle of solidarity between member states was implemented in this case
(through the EU institutions). The problem arise because the solidarity
between member states in this case means working against the EU general
interests. This is just illustration that EU suffered from not having appropriate
mechanism. This kind of situation had influence on CFSP in general and
through Macedonia individually.
Although Greece successfully managed to channelize its positions in
the official positions of the Union, within the EU there were other opinions as
well. “Internal tensions within the Union were publicly shown on January 20,
1993 by the Danish Minister of Foreign UffeEllemann-Jensen which has
attracted the attention of Greek members of the European Parliament when
he characterized the Greek position as ‘ridiculous’ and expressed hope that
the Security Council would very soon recognize Macedonia and that many of
the Member States of the Communities would support this."(Gallagher 2005,
p.7) Such statements we can consider much more as a kind of contraction on
the Greek position than existence of member states that strongly supports
Macedonia. Nevertheless, they were a strong support for the young
independent Republic of Macedonia and a stimulus for the country to continue
fighting for the establishment of better relations with the EU.
In the later years EU dedicated much more attention to Macedonia and
was one of the main factors for the stability in Macedonia especially during the
2001 conflict. Macedonia was the first country from the western Balkan that
has signed the Association and Stabilizations Agreement42. Macedonia was
42 04.2001
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the place where EU sent its first policy mission43. Macedonia has obtained
official status of EU candidate country44 and the Commission is constantly
giving its opinion about the Macedonian progress in the fulfilling of the
Copenhagen criteria and becoming a member. Apart of the good mutually
relations between Macedonia and EU there are still same problems… But this
is broader and another topic.
Conclusion
We can single out three important conclusions.
First, a large part of the Yugoslav crisis was managed by the EU which
did not handle the best in that role. In this context, the EU did not cope with
the process of Macedonian independence the best too. If the interest of the
Union was to stop further escalation of the wars in Yugoslavia, in this case
Macedonia should have been much more supported. We can note a certain
contradiction because the Union actually worked against its own interests
because the lack of appropriate mechanisms at the beginning of the post cold
world. In this way, the EU policy toward Macedonian in the time of the
Yugoslav crises was quite controversial.
Secondly, we can conclude that the most attention and energy of the
external EU policy during the Yugoslav crises was directed towards the
situation in Slovenia, Croatia and later to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only a
small part of their diplomatic activity has been directed towards Macedonia.
But we must note that the relations between EU and Macedonia will be much
more improved in next couple of years and Macedonia will have much more
attention by EU.
Finally, while Croatia and Slovenia had a strong EU supporter member,
we can not say the same for Macedonia.
43EUFOR Concordia, 03. 2003- 12.200344 03.2004
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